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Abstract
In a review into automated and malicious activity Twitter re-
leased a list of accounts that they believed were connected
to state sponsored manipulation of the 2016 American Elec-
tion. This list details 2,752 accounts Twitter believed to be
controlled by Russian operatives. In the absence of a simi-
lar list of operatives active within the debate on the 2016 UK
referendum on membership of the European Union (Brexit)
we investigated the behaviour of the same American Election
focused accounts in the production of content related to the
UK-EU referendum. We found that within our dataset we had
Brexit-related content from 419 of these accounts, leading
to 3,485 identified tweets gathered between the 29th August
2015 and 3rd October 2017. The behaviour of the accounts
altered radically on the day of the referendum, shifting from
generalised disruptive tweeting to retweeting each other in or-
der to amplify content produced by other troll accounts. We
also demonstrate that, while these accounts are, in general,
designed to resemble American citizens, accounts created in
2016 often contained German locations and terms in the user
profiles.
Introduction
Trolls are internet users who attempt to manipulate opin-
ion by spreading rumours, speculation and false information
(Mihaylov, Georgiev, and Nakov 2015). Twitter identified
2,752 troll accounts they claim are likely run by the Internet
Research Agency (IRA), a Russian company that was iden-
tified as tweeting about the US 2016 elections.1 2
We have been collecting tweets on the topic of the UK-
EU ‘Brexit’ referendum since August 2015. In our dataset
we have 3,485 tweets from 419 troll accounts that were
collected between the 29th August 2015 and 3rd October
2017. These tweets were about the Brexit vote and topics
that were expected to influence the vote, such as the EU,
refugees and migrants. In total, we have collected over 70
million Brexit-related tweets; 3,485 is therefore a tiny pro-
portion of the overall number but does indicate that these
trolls, who tweeted about the US elections, were also active
in the Brexit debate.
1https://democrats-intelligence.house.gov/
uploadedfiles/exhibit_b.pdf
2Twitter released a further 1,062 accounts on the 19th January
2018, these are not included in this study
As a consequence of our ethical procedure and following
legal advice we are unable to disclose or share usernames,
the usernames of retweeted users (unless they are verified
users) or any full tweets. We utilise this information in our
analysis but it remains confidential. Access to any images
or videos contained in these tweets is no longer possible as
these have been removed from the Twitter website. Our find-
ings, utilising the tweet text and metadata from derived and
aggregated data allow us to provide important insights into
the behaviour of these Twitter trolls and the types of content
that their tweets contain.
Senate Testimony
On October 31st 2017 Sean Edgett, a legal representative of
Twitter, presented evidence to the United States Senate Ju-
diciary Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism. 3 His report
provided details of 36,746 accounts that automatically gen-
erated election content (referred to as ‘bots’). He also pro-
vided details of 2,752 accounts that were linked to the IRA,
a Russian company thought to be involved in the creation
of online propaganda. He stated that these 2,752 accounts
were identified using information obtained by Twitter from
third-party sources. These 2,752 accounts also produced au-
tomated content, but approximately 53% of the content as-
sociated with these accounts was produced by humans (re-
ferred to as ‘trolls’).
Twitter studied tweets from 1st September 2016 to 15th
November 2016. Not all of the content posted by these ac-
counts during the time period studied was about the US elec-
tion (only approximately 9%) and over 47% of the content
was automated. In written testimony these accounts were
described as being ‘Russian election-focused efforts’.2 The
troll accounts posed as news outlets, activists, and politi-
cally engaged Americans. Edgett’s testimony describes the
troll behaviour as: contacting prominent individuals through
mentions, organising political events and abusive behaviour
and harassment. All 2,752 accounts have been suspended
and the information posted by them is therefore no longer
available through Twitter.
As part of a review of ‘Fake News’ the British Member of
Parliament, Damian Collins, who is the Chair of the Digital,
3
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/
download/10-31-17-edgett-testimony
Culture, Media and Sports Select Committee asked that the
UK parliament be provided with ‘a list of accounts linked to
the Internet Research Agency and any other Russian linked
accounts that it [Twitter] has removed and examples of any
posts from these accounts that are linked to the United King-
dom’. 4 Twitter responded with six tweets from Russia To-
day. In the absence of a specific officially-published list, de-
tailing accounts from the IRA that were active in the Brexit
debate, we investigate whether any of the accounts known
to be active on the 2016 US Election also produced content
related to Brexit.
Tweets and Retweets
In the report given by Twitter to the Senate committee2 it
is stated that, of the tweets studied from the 1st September
2016 to the 15th November 2016, 1% were US election re-
lated. Of these 1% of election related tweets, 0.74% were
Russian linked and had been detected by Twitter either as
automation or spam. In its report to Senate, Twitter only con-
siders original Tweets; all retweets are excluded.
The report indicates that Twitter identified 131,000 tweets
from the accounts identified in the IRA list. Of these 9%
were about the American Election (11,790). The total num-
ber of tweets annotated by Twitter as Election Related was
189 million which means that 0.006% of Election related
content was created by the IRA trolls.
We analysed our longitudinal Brexit-related data set for
evidence of activity from the 2,752 IRA linked troll ac-
counts identified to Senate by Twitter. We confirmed that
these accounts were creating Brexit related content. In total
we found 3,485 tweets from the IRA linked accounts, repre-
senting 0.005% of the total data we collected.
The 0.005% figure for Brexit as opposed to 0.006% figure
for the US Election indicates that there is a lower level of
activity in our set of trolls discussing Brexit. Possible causal
factors include:
• that trolls, created to target the US election, are less active
on the Brexit topic;
• trolls are more active at certain points, the lower level ac-
tivity seen here could be a factor of the longitudinal nature
of our data set. We gathered and analysed data from a pe-
riod of over two years whilst Twitter presented an analy-
sis of data from 1st September 2016 until 15th November
2016;
• that there are other trolls that are more active in the Brexit
debate but they are not on this list.
This 0.005%figure includes retweets and drops to 0.002%
when these are excluded. In our troll dataset 57.59% of data
are retweets.
Our analysis of this longitudinal dataset allows us to
present a study of the changes in activity and troll behaviour
over time and in response to external events. In particular,
we note a change in retweeting behaviour on the 23rd June
2016, the day of the UK-EU referendum vote. On this day
4
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/
commons-committees/culture-media-and-sport/
171103-Chair-to-Jack-Dorsey-Twitter.pdf
we captured 1,059,888 tweets in total. Out of this total, 389
of these tweets were from troll accounts (0.037%): nearly
an eight-fold (7.4) increase in the relative number of tweets
that came from trolls. The vast majority of tweets captured
on this day were retweets, something the headline value of
0.74% in the US Twitter report would fail to identify. In fact,
only eleven tweets were original tweets. If we were to cal-
culate troll activity excluding retweets, we find that on this
day 0.001% of original data are from trolls. Conducting the
calculation in this way would indicate a decrease in troll ac-
tivity rather than an increase. This highlights that, although
the trolls were more active on the day of the Brexit refer-
endum vote, there was a change in their behaviour and they
produced more retweets and less original content. We must
therefore consider this when we evaluate the 0.74% value
given by Twitter.
Brexit Data Collection
We have been collecting Twitter data on the UK-EU referen-
dum (Brexit) since August 2015. These data have enabled us
to study discussions leading up the referendum and the con-
sequential reaction to the decision of the UK to leave the Eu-
ropean Union. Data were gathered through the Twitter API
based on a selection of relevant hashtags chosen by a panel
of academic experts. The set of hashtags grew periodically to
reflect the evolving conversation. The dataset currently con-
tains over seventy million tweets (Llewellyn and Cram 2017;
Llewellyn, Cram, and Favero 2016).
The terms of service of the Twitter Developer Agreement
ask that all Tweets are ‘deleted within 24 hours after a re-
quest to do so by Twitter’. 5 We have an automated method
in place that removes all tweets as requested. Therefore, it is
possible tweets relevant to this study have been deleted.
This data is collected and archived to allow us to study the
ongoing discussion and opinions regarding Brexit. The user
accounts of the trolls identified by Twitter have now been
deleted and are not available from Twitter directly. Archived
copies of tweets are now the only way we can conduct aca-
demic research into troll activity in the Brexit discussion.
We know that we are likely only to have a proportion of the
content produced by the trolls. In this paper we can only
analyse what we have found and remain aware that this data
is probably a sub-sample of what was originally produced.
The selection of hashtags used to gather data ensured that
we gathered both tweets that related to the Brexit vote di-
rectly and also to topics that were expected by experts to
influence opinions on Brexit. When researching whether the
troll accounts were active in the Brexit discussions we de-
cided to split the data into tweets that were directly about
Brexit and those that contained other Brexit related topics.
We annotated tweets we had gathered from the troll accounts
on the basis of whether they were directly about Brexit or
not. The annotators were asked to be conservative and only
to include tweets in the Brexit set if they were absolutely
certain they were directly about Brexit. We found that 1,357
5
https://developer.twitter.com/en/
developer-terms/agreement-and-policy
were directly about Brexit, 2,109 were not and 19 were dif-
ficult to decide. This gave us 38.94% of the tweets that
were directly about Brexit. Henceforth we will call these
sets ‘Brexit Tweets’ and ‘Related Tweets’. The 19 unde-
cided tweets were excluded from the study. All of the tweets
were annotated by a single coder. We double coded a sam-
ple (100) of the tweets to validate consistency and measure
inter-annotator agreement, producing a kappa score of 0.80
indicative of very high agreement. These tweets contained
multi-lingual content: English, German and Italian. Both an-
notators were fluent in all of these languages.
Related Work
Automatic generation of Twitter content is common-place.
Bessi and Ferrara (2016) found that one fifth of the Twit-
ter conversation about the 2016 US Elections was not gen-
erated by humans. ‘Bot’ accounts are set up to automati-
cally retweet and aggregate content from other sources or
to create automatically generated text. ‘Influence bots’ were
described in the DARPA Twitter Bot Challenge as bots de-
signed to influence discussion on social media sites (Subrah-
manian et al. 2016). Much of this content has no malicious
intent, but some is designed to mislead or influence other
users with misinformation and spam.
Social media companies are not required to fact check
information. Catchiness and repeatability can lead to
widespread dissemination of content whether it is true or not
(Ratkiewicz et al. 2011). Bots are often used as a method for
repeating information and making it appear that the infor-
mation is popular (Ferrara et al. 2016).
As bots have become more advanced, they are able to in-
teract with other bots and humans in a conversational type
way making them more believable and increasing their so-
cial networks (Ferrara et al. 2016). Automatically extract-
ing information from real users and from the wider internet
allows the automatic generation of life-like user profile in-
formation creating complex and believable sock puppet per-
sonas (Ferrara et al. 2016).
Automated accounts can be used to produce large
amounts of content on single issues, where many accounts
become active and tweet on the same topic at once forming
a ‘bot legion’ (Chu et al. 2012a). Ratkiewicz et al (2011) de-
scribe how nine fake users tweeted 929 times in 138 minutes
in a 2009 Massachusetts election. This type of activity is in-
tended to start a cascade of information-spreadingwith non-
automated accounts reproducing the content. Messages are
also more likely to be believed if they are seen from multi-
ple sources (Ratkiewicz et al. 2011) as it creates a wallpaper
effect where information is seen so often it becomes back-
ground noise and is assumed to be true.
As shown by Bessi and Ferrara (2016) much of this au-
tomatically generated content can be automatically detected
and extensive work has been conducted in this area, includ-
ing the DARPA challenge. Systems have been created that
are based on social network information, crowd sourcing
and machine learning (Ferrara et al. 2016; Davis et al. 2016).
The 2,752 Twitter accounts detailed in the Senate list are
not automated accounts but ’cyborgs’ which are at least par-
tially operated by humans (Chu et al. 2012b). These are
harder to detect than bots as they have the behaviour pat-
terns of both bots and humans.
Astro-turfing describes the use of bots, cyborgs or sock
puppets to emulate the personas of individuals involved in
grass root political movements (Ratkiewicz et al. 2011).
This activity is intended to foster a sense of group iden-
tity amongst individuals that share certain traits. These traits
help other users identify with them and make them more
likely to be sympathetic towards their opinions. The more
often human users are exposed to content the more likely
they are to align with the perspectives being shared (Del Vi-
cario et al. 2016).
Astro-turf cyborgs commonly combine political informa-
tion with more general human content. Keller et al (2017)
found that cyborg trolls were used in astro-turfing by the
South Korean secret service in the 2012 elections. They ob-
served specific behaviour patterns: having many accounts
tweet the same tweet at the same time to influence trend-
ing topics, having an agent cut and paste roughly the same
content into many accounts, and a consistent time pattern
for the activity in the accounts. They found that human troll
accounts often act in similar and repetitive ways, as the in-
dividuals trolls are following central instructions.
Howard and Kollanyi (2016), in a study of tweets col-
lected between 5th and the 12th June 2016 in the UK-EU ref-
erendum, found that bots played a ‘small but strategic role in
the referendum conversations’ but that not all accounts were
completely automated. Bastos and Mercea (2017) found a
network of 13,493 bots that tweeted on the UK-EU referen-
dum but disappeared after the ballot, concluding that these
accounts were involved in the amplification of human cre-
ated content.
User Information
The list provided by Twitter to the US Senate contained
2,752 accounts that were thought to contain troll activity.
Within our full data set we found tweets from 419 of these
accounts. We had more than one tweet from 66.83% ac-
counts. In the Brexit Tweets set we had tweets from 267 ac-
counts.We foundmore than one tweet from 56.68% of those
accounts indicating that most accounts did engage with the
Brexit topic multiple times.
As seen in Table 1 there is a high overlap between the
most frequent tweeters in each set. The accounts tweeted
both about Brexit and related topics. We have most tweets
from account a, an account that tweets in English and mostly
retweets rather than producing original content.
We examined the information from the user metadata as
extracted from the troll tweets. This user metadata is either
generated automatically or added by the account holder. The
information can change over time and/or be altered by the
user; for example the number of followers is an automated
value that can vary but the user profile location field can be
added by the account holder. Information that is added by the
user can indicate the role of the account. If we assume that
the accounts are all created by the Internet Research Agency,
an account could be created to look like an American in-
dividual with a particular political opinion and this can be
Table 1: Most frequent Tweeters in all of the data (All), the
data related to Brexit but not directly on Brexit (Related)
and the data purely on Brexit (Brexit). Account usernames
are anonymised.
All Related Brexit
Account Tweets Account Tweets Account Tweets
a 537 a 375 a 162
b 280 b 232 b 48
c 153 d 109 c 45
d 131 c 108 e 30
e 114 e 84 f 30
f 95 g 75 l 29
g 94 f 64 d 22
h 71 h 61 m 21
j 71 j 58 n 21
k 45 k 43 o 20
Figure 1: Creation dates of the troll accounts.
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expressed through the information added in fields such as
location and user description.
Account creation date is an automatic field and can not
be changed. As can be seen in Figure 1 most of the ac-
counts were created in 2013 and 2014 after the 2012 US
Election but well before both the 2016 US Election and the
UK-EU Brexit Referendum. There are more accounts cre-
ated in 2016, the year of the US Election (and the Brexit
vote), than in either 2015 or 2017. Of the forty-four accounts
created in 2016 thirty-eight were created after the UK Brexit
referendum but before the US election, all but one of these
within a very tight window of ten days between 4th and 13th
of July.
To further determine who the accounts were intended to
represent we analysed the user description field in the tweet
metadata. We counted the occurrences of terms by the year
of account creation, and we removed very common english
and german words. A user can change the text in this field
at anytime but we did not find any evidence of changes in
the data we collected. The full list of terms can be seen in
Table 2. Many of the accounts do not have any terms at all
in the user description field. The counts in Table 2 are small
but do indicate a pattern. In 2013-2015 the accounts con-
tained description terms that indicate American, conserva-
tive, patriotic personas, suggesting that the accounts were
designed to influence American events. But in 2016 many
of the terms are German, mag (like), glaube (I believe), uern
(likely a shortening of a¨ußern which translates as express).
Therefore, the accounts created in 2016 may not have been
designed to tweet about the US election but something more
European based instead.
When we looked at the user descriptions of the forty-four
accounts created in 2016 we found twelve of the accounts
created in July 2016 had German language descriptions (of
the rest one was in English, one was mixed German and En-
glish, two only contained hashtags, and the rest were empty).
For comparison, in 2015, sixteen were in English, three in
German and four were empty.
This German language use in accounts created after the
2016 Brexit vote suggests that the trolls were using the result
of the vote to push an agenda related to Germany, perhaps
anticipating the German elections in 2017.
We confirmed the change in location by checking by hand
the location fields of tweets in the Brexit set. We did not
see any evidence in our data set that these fields had been
changed over time but this is possible. We found 154 were in
some way based in the USA, sixteen in Europe and three in
Russia (94 had no location information). The sixteen Euro-
pean accounts were made up of seven German accounts, five
Italian accounts, three from the UK and one from Belgium.
To give a better idea of the types of locations described we
give the term counts from the location field in Table 3. We
can see that the European based accounts were created in
2016 and later. This location information suggests that most
of the accounts on the list submitted by Twitter to US Sen-
ate were indeed designed to look like they are from the USA.
The agenda they were designed to follow was also related to
the USA, but those created in and after 2016 had a different
agenda.
Some of the accounts have many followers and therefore
a high potential to reach other Twitter users. We used the
maximumnumber of followers when we had multiple tweets
from an account. Of the 267 that have tweeted about Brexit:
122 accounts have more than 1,000 followers, sixteen ac-
counts have over 10,000 and one account has over 100,000.
The median number of followers is 875. As we cannot tell
from this dataset how many of the trolls follow each other,
this high median number should be treated with caution.
Tweet Information
The hashtags that are used by the troll accounts indicate
the different topics discussed in both the Brexit Tweet and
the Related Tweet sets. Table 4 shows the top hashtags in
each set. In the Brexit Tweet set the hashtags used are re-
lated to Brexit, Britain, and the EU. In the top ten we also
find hashtags relating to Chancellor Merkel, #merkel, and
#merkelmussbleiben (which translates as #merkelmuststay).
The trolls are directly discussing Brexit but also using wider
hashtags for example referring to the role of the German
Table 2: Frequency of terms from the user level description field split by year
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
conservative 16 conservative 9 love 5 usa 5 trump 5
blacklivesmatter 15 tcot 6 proud 4 ttip 3 2a 3
love 11 wakeupamerica 5 tcot 4 fr 3 follow 2
tcot 11 patriot 4 family 4 mag 3 mom 2
dont 8 supporter 4 country 4 glaube 2 god 2
pjnet 7 life 4 christian 3 uern 2 starke 1
wakeupamerica 7 pjnet 3 conservative 3 studiere 2 corodinator 1
life 7 dont 3 patriot 2 freizeit 2 broker 1
2a 6 2a 3 youre 2 spiele 2 moment 1
Table 3: Frequency of terms from the user location field split by year
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
usa 51 usa 21 usa 6 deutschland 3 estados 4
states 12 atlanta 10 texas 3 berlin 2 unidos 4
united 12 us 5 germany 2 hessen 1 italia 2
chicago 4 states 3 brussel 1 main 1
us 4 united 3 stlouis 1 lombardia 1
il 4 la 2 tennessee 1 frankfurt 1
ny 3 new 2 states 1 italy 1
baltimore 2 york 2 richmond 1 sicilia 1
ga 2 pittsburgh 1 united 1 itala 1
atlanta 2 ga 1 wisconsin 1 milano 1
Chancellor Merkel, underlining the wider European context
of the Brexit debate.
In the Related Tweet set we can see that the trolls use
hashtags about the EU, #eu; about refugees, #refugeeswel-
come, #flchtlinge (which translates as #refugee) and
#refugee. We see mentions of the German Chancellor,
#merkel and the President of Turkey #erdogan, we also see
reference to Germany, #deutschland and Turkey #trke. We
also see that tweets that were classified as not directly about
Brexit are still being tagged with the #brexit hashtag.
The way that the hashtags are being used in the wider
Brexit related set suggests that the trolls have an agenda that
related to Germany and Turkey and were using the Brexit
topic to push this agenda and the issue of migration. The
last elections in Germany were held on the 24th September
2017, and in Turkey there was a constitutional referendum
held on the 16th April 2017.
Tweets, Retweets and Verified Users
We wanted to look at how the trolls behaved when directly
discussing Brexit. We found that the Brexit Tweet subset
contains a higher percentage of retweets and those retweets
are less likely to be retweets of verified users and more likely
to originally come from other trolls than the wider set.
The total number of tweets that we gathered was 3,485; of
these, 2,007 are retweets (57.59%). Within the Brexit Tweet
subset of 1,357 tweets 989 were retweets (72.88%). In the
full set there are 775 tweets that were originally created by
verified users (38.61%) and then retweeted by trolls. In the
Brexit Tweet subset 321 tweets are originally from verified
users (subsequently forming 32% of retweets).
Table 4: Hashtags frequency across the data specifically on
Brexit (Brexit) and those on Brexit related tweets (Related)
Brexit Related
#brexit 825 #eu 1206
#britaininout 378 #merkel 286
#euref 364 #refugeeswelcome 281
#brexitornot 211 #flchtlinge 199
#goodbyeuk 188 #erdogan 158
#brexitinout 186 #europe 153
#remainineu 168 #deutschland 146
#eu 158 #trkei 128
#merkelmussbleiben 125 #brexit 113
#merkel 111 #refugee 80
Out of the 104 accounts retweeted in the Brexit Tweets
set 57 (54.81%) were only ever retweeted once. The most
frequently retweeted verified users are presented in Table 5.
We can see that the top retweets come from news outlets, the
EU Council and the EU Comission.
We also find that trolls retweet trolls. In the total set there
are 443 retweets (22.07%) from 34 different trolls (17 of
these trolls were only in the set as retweets). In the Brexit
Tweets set 345 are retweets (34.88%) from 25 other trolls
(10 only ever as retweets). In the Brexit Tweet subset one
specific troll has been retweeted 186 times by the other
trolls, which means that 5.33% of all data gathered origi-
nated from a single account.
When we look at the Brexit Tweet set and split the data
into original content and retweets from the troll accounts we
Table 5: Verified Users Retweeted
Account Retweeted Screen Name No.
Retweets
Description
eucounciltvnews EU Council TV NewsVerified
account
48 Video coverage of Council news. Download our video packages
in broadcast quality or embed them on your web page.
business Bloomberg 40 The first word in business news.
eucopresident Donald Tusk 13 Twitter channel of Donald Tusk, President of the European
Council. Managed by the media team.
bloombergtv Bloomberg TV 10 Breaking news. Exclusive interviews. Market-moving scoops.
Watch Bloomberg #Daybreak LIVE on @Twitter, every week-
day from 7:00 - 9:00 AM ET.
eu commission European Commission 10 News and information from the European Commission. Tweets
by the Social Media Team. Engaging on #TeamJunckerEUpri-
orities: http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/
federicamog Federica Mogherini 10 High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy. Vice President of the EU Commission
rtuknews RT UK 8 RT UK broadcasts from its studio in London. Watch LIVE UK
news, documentaries and talk shows. Get even more on our
website.
zvezdanews TV channel ”Zvezda” 7 Nobody before us!
sputnikint Sputnik 6 Sputnik is a global wire, radio and digital news service. We exist
to tell the stories that are not being told.
tagesschau tagesschau 6 The news of the ARD
Table 6: Terms from Brexit set tweets (hashtags removed),
data split by whether the tweet is a retweet or not
Original Content Retweets
nachdem 32 eu 62
eu 30 european 54
fr 25 uk 41
may 21 doorstep 35
gibt 21 council 35
merkel 21 la 28
negativen 20 deal 26
frau 20 vote 24
folgen 20 britain 24
neue 19 special 22
can see a difference in the language used. We removed all
of the hashtags, as these were the most frequent terms and
masked other term usage. Very common english and a ger-
man words were also removed. If we look at Table 6 we
can see that original content tends to contain german words
whereas retweeted content tends to contain english terms.
Tweet Dates
Overall there were very few tweets per day from the troll
accounts. The number of tweets per day follows a similar
pattern in both the Brexit Tweet and the Related Tweet sets.
We can see in Figure 2 that there are several spikes of ac-
tivity for the Brexit Tweets dataset. In Table 7 we show the
dates, volumes, whether the tweet was original content or a
retweet and what was happening in the news that may have
triggered the content. We found that the spikes in content
production are related to particular events such as the ref-
erendum vote itself or the UK Prime Minister May meeting
German Chancellor Merkel. We can see that there is a differ-
Figure 2: Number of tweets per day that are directly relevant
to brexit
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ence in troll behaviour on two dates that exhibit higher tweet
volumes. On the 23rd June 2016 there is a large increase
in volume of tweets produced but these are almost entirely
retweets (97.73%). In contrast, on the 21st July 2016 there
was a considerably larger proportion of original content pro-
duced: only 26.56% are retweets. There is also a conspicu-
ous spike on the 19th February 2016. On a closer inspection
of the data from this day, we found that all the tweets come
from a single troll account.
The Day of the Brexit Referendum
The largest number of troll tweets was collected on the day
of the referendum, the 23rd of June 2016. We collected 400
Table 7: Further information about the days that had the
highest frequency of tweets
Date Tweets % RT What happened on that
day?
19/02/2016 44 100.00 Cameron at EU summit
23/06/2016 398 97.74 UK-EU referendum
24/06/2016 51 49.02 Day after UK-EU referen-
dum
28/06/2016 47 70.21 Cameron to meet EU lead-
ers
21/07/2016 128 26.56 May meets Merkle
29/03/2017 40 45.00 UK triggers Brexit
29/04/2017 32 100.00 EU Discussion of brexit
without UK
Figure 3: Number of tweets on the 23rd June by hour
06:00 10:00 14:00 18:00
0
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in total of which 398 were directly about Brexit. On this day
out of the 398 Brexit Tweets only nine tweets (and eleven
tweets out of the 400 total) consisted of original content, the
rest being retweets. 97.73% of tweets on the day of the ref-
erendum were retweets. The trolls were therefore focused
entirely on Brexit but they were retweeting rather than pro-
ducing original content.
None of the tweets on the day of the UK’s EU refer-
endum were retweets of verified users. This is a radical
change of behaviour. Out of the 387 retweets 279 were
retweets of other trolls from the list isssued to Senate by
Twitter (72.10%). These tweets originate from only 11
troll accounts, and 186 were retweets originating from a
single troll account. These 186 tweets exhibit a very similar
homogeneity in style, content and format (text in italics
altered from original):
@USER #brexitornot #britaininout #brexitinout
#euref https://t.co/VARIOUS
In Figure 3 we see the frequency of tweets grouped by
hour across the day of the referendum. This reveals that the
vast majority of tweets were sent between 2pm and 4pm.
Table 8: The most frequent hashtags from the brexit dataset
on the 23rd June 2016, the day of the referendum and on all
other days
All other days 23rd June 2016
#brexit 787 #britaininout 378
#eu 148 #euref 354
#merkelmussbleiben 125 #brexitornot 211
#merkel 110 #goodbyeuk 187
#euco 89 #brexitinout 186
#ukineu 64 #remainineu 168
#may 60 #brexit 38
#uk 33 #reasonstoleaveeu 14
#article50 31 #eu 10
#girlstalkselfies 18 #uk 8
There were no tweets after 4pm although the referendum
polls did not close until 10pm. The nine tweets consisting of
original content were tweeted early in the day, while only
two original tweets were tweeted after 2pm (at 2pm and
2.45pm).
Amplification Behaviour
A social media amplifier is defined as a user that shares ideas
and opinions (Tinati et al. 2012). In this context we will use
the term amplifier to classify an account which, as far as we
can see from the data we have collected, only ever retweets.
Overall there was very different pattern of behaviour ex-
hibited by the trolls on the 23rd June, with a greater propen-
sity to retweet, particularly sharing more information from
other trolls. Overall in our set we have a large number
of trolls who are amplifiers. To judge if their behaviour
changed on the referendum polling day we analysed troll
accounts which sent tweets on both the 23rd June and other
days. In the Brexit Tweets set we have tweets from 248 troll
accounts, of which 38 of them were active on the 23rd June
2016. Of those accounts, 19 (50%) also appear on other
days. This could suggest that the other 19 troll accounts only
tweeted about Brexit on the 23rd June or it could just mean
we did not catch them in our dataset.
There were only nine tweets that were not retweets on the
23rd June. Those original content tweets all came from ac-
counts that tweeted on other days as well. In this data set
the accounts that only tweeted on the 23rd June 2016 were
amplifiers. Thirteen of the accounts acted as amplifiers on
the 23rd June and twelve in the wider time period. As we
do not have all of the tweets produced by all trolls we can-
not establish a definitive pattern but this suggests that, while
some accounts may simply be amplifiers, content producers
can also switch their behaviour to amplification if required.
Users may be more likely to be one or another but these be-
haviour patterns can change. On the day of the referendum
vote we found that all of the IRA troll accounts were more
likely to be involved in amplification behaviour.
Sentiment and Stance
We annotated the 1,357 Brexit Tweets for both stance and
sentiment. The annotator was asked to rate the stance of the
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tweets as either pro-leaving the EU, pro-remaining in the
EU or neutral/neither. For sentiment the tweets were anno-
tated as containing positive, negative or neutral sentiment.
The majority of tweets were both neutral in stance (78.78%)
and neutral in sentiment (64.41%), although this may be a
consequence of the lack of available image or video con-
text. In general the tweets had a stronger pro-leave stance
(14.96%) than pro-remain (6.26%). The split of sentiment
was fairly equal with a positive sentiment (18.35%) being
very slightly higher than negative sentiment (17.24%).
The pro-leave stance was consistently higher throughout
the time period as shown in Figure 4. The sentiment scores
do change over time as can be seen in Figure 5. In partic-
ular there was a spike of positive sentiment tweets on the
21st July 2016. As previously stated this was a spike in vol-
ume that occurred on the day that UK Prime Minister May
met German Chancellor Merkel. A high percentage of these
(73.44%) were not retweets and the tweets were in German.
The content driving this change in sentiment direction re-
volves around Chancellor Merkel, describing her as a strong
person that will handle the Brexit issue well. The trolls
discuss new possibilities and options after Brexit and that
Frankfurt will be soon in a stronger position. A few trolls
also talk about the EU accession of Turkey and that Merkel
does not want any negotiations if Turkey re-introduces the
death penalty.
User Accounts Released 19th Jan 2017
On the 19th January 2017 Twitter released a statement say-
ing that they were adding a further 1,062 accounts associated
with the Internet Research Agency. We have yet to see these
account usernames.
Discussion
The Internet Research Agency accounts identified by Twitter
were active in the Brexit debate. These tweets were slightly
more likely to be pro-leave than pro-remain.
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These accounts were not designed to look like either pro-
leave or pro-remain grassroots individuals. It is likely they
were designed to be active in the American and perhaps lat-
terly in the German Elections. This raises two questions: do
accounts designed by the Internet Research Agency to look
like grassroots Brexit groups exist? and why were the Amer-
ican and German sock-puppets tweeting about Brexit?
The answer to the first question is unknown. To the sec-
ond question, it could be either be that these tweets are
background noise designed to make the accounts look ei-
ther more human or more politically aware, or that the topic
of Brexit was used to promote another agenda such as insta-
bility and disruption.
We also observe the high-level retweeting of verified users
again possibly to create the illusion of a politically active
human.
We observe ‘bot legion’ behaviour on the 23rd June
2016. Many retweets that contain very similar content were
tweeted over a short time frame. It is likely that these were
produced automatically or exhibit the cut and paste be-
haviour seen in the South Korean Election. It looks like these
American and German persona had been instructed to tweet
on the Brexit topic en masse.
There are other spikes in data production that were not
produced by mass retweet events. We see on the 21st July
there was a high level of positive original content produced
that wass related to Merkel and Brexit, certainly pointing
towards the use of Brexit as a supporting issue.
The longitudinal nature of the data collection technique
that we use offers the opportunity to investigate behavioural
changes and adaptation. If we had studied these data from
the 23rd June 2016 in isolation then the cyborg troll accounts
would have simply resembled bot accounts. In order to suc-
cessfuly identify the cyborg accounts we need to systemati-
cally look for changes in behaviour over time.
References
Bastos, M. T., and Mercea, D. 2017. The brexit botnet and
user-generated hyperpartisan news. Social Science Com-
puter Review 0894439317734157.
Bessi, A., and Ferrara, E. 2016. Social bots distort the
2016 us presidential election online discussion. First Mon-
day 21(11).
Chu, Z.; Gianvecchio, S.; Wang, H.; and Jajodia, S. 2012a.
Detecting automation of twitter accounts: Are you a human,
bot, or cyborg? IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Se-
cure Computing 9(6):811–824.
Chu, Z.; Gianvecchio, S.; Wang, H.; and Jajodia, S. 2012b.
Detecting automation of twitter accounts: Are you a human,
bot, or cyborg? IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Se-
cure Computing 9(6):811–824.
Davis, C. A.; Varol, O.; Ferrara, E.; Flammini, A.; and
Menczer, F. 2016. Botornot: A system to evaluate social
bots. In Proceedings of the 25th International Conference
Companion on World Wide Web, 273–274. International
World Wide Web Conferences Steering Committee.
Del Vicario, M.; Bessi, A.; Zollo, F.; Petroni, F.; Scala, A.;
Caldarelli, G.; Stanley, H. E.; and Quattrociocchi, W. 2016.
The spreading of misinformation online. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences 113(3):554–559.
Ferrara, E.; Varol, O.; Davis, C.; Menczer, F.; and Flammini,
A. 2016. The rise of social bots. Communications of the
ACM 59(7):96–104.
Howard, P. N., and Kollanyi, B. 2016. Bots,# strongerin,
and# brexit: Computational propaganda during the uk-eu
referendum. Browser Download This Paper.
Keller, F. B.; Schoch, D.; Stier, S.; and Yang, J. 2017. How
to manipulate social media: Analyzing political astroturfing
using ground truth data from south korea. In ICWSM, 564–
567.
Llewellyn, C., and Cram, L. 2017. Distinguishing the wood
from the trees: Contrasting collection methods to understand
bias in a longitudinal brexit twitter dataset. In ICWSM, 596–
599.
Llewellyn, C.; Cram, L.; and Favero, A. 2016. Avoiding
the drunkard’s search: Investigating collection strategies for
building a twitter dataset. In Digital Libraries (JCDL), 2016
IEEE/ACM Joint Conference on, 205–206. IEEE.
Mihaylov, T.; Georgiev, G.; and Nakov, P. 2015. Finding
opinion manipulation trolls in news community forums. In
CoNLL, 310–314.
Ratkiewicz, J.; Conover, M.; Meiss, M. R.; Gonc¸alves, B.;
Flammini, A.; and Menczer, F. 2011. Detecting and tracking
political abuse in social media. ICWSM 11:297–304.
Subrahmanian, V.; Azaria, A.; Durst, S.; Kagan, V.; Gal-
styan, A.; Lerman, K.; Zhu, L.; Ferrara, E.; Flammini, A.;
and Menczer, F. 2016. The darpa twitter bot challenge.
Computer 49(6):38–46.
Tinati, R.; Carr, L.; Hall, W.; and Bentwood, J. 2012. Iden-
tifying communicator roles in twitter. In Proceedings of the
21st International Conference on World Wide Web, 1161–
1168. ACM.
